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Abstract
We study the causal impact of credit constraints on exporters using a natural experiment provided by two policy
changes in India, first in 1998 which made small-scale firms eligible for subsidized direct credit, and a subsequent
reversal in policy in 2000 wherein some of these firms lost their eligibility. Using firms that were not affected by
these policy changes as our control group, we find that credit expansion increased the growth rate of bank borrowing
and had a positive effect on exports.The subsequent policy reversal in 2000 had no impact on the growth rate of
bank borrowing or on exports.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Subsidized credit given by the government to exporting firms has played an important role in1
the rapid export-oriented growth of East Asian countries (see for example, Kokko [2002] for a detailed2
discussion of the growth experiences of Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan). Firms that export3
are usually larger firms (in terms of employment) and better performing firms than non-exporting firms4
(Bernard and Jensen [1999]) and so credit directed at exporting firms is of considerable importance in5
increasing economy wide employment and growth.6
In this paper we contribute to the empirical literature on the export-finance linkage. We study7
the effects of government provision of and subsequent removal of subsidized credit on the real outcomes8
of exporting firms (firm sales, export earnings, etc.) for a panel of Indian firms. We make use of two9
exogenous policy changes in India that affected how much subsidized credit was available to small-scale10
firms. The first policy change, introduced in 1998, changed the eligibility criteria for subsidized credit11
to be given to small-sized firms. As a result of this policy change, some of the small sized firms were12
classified as “priority sector firms” and became eligible for the first time to get subsidized credit from the13
banks. However, in 2000, some of these firms (which had newly become part of the priority sector) were14
removed from the priority sector and were no longer eligible to get subsidized credit from the banks.15
We use firms that were affected by these policy changes as our treatment group (in each case). For16
each of these treatment group firms we use firms not affected by these policy changes as our comparison17
group (in each case). We find that subsidized credit provided to newly eligible firms increased the rate18
of growth of total bank borrowing for these newly eligible firms by 20 percent and increased their rate of19
growth of exports by approximately 24 percent (these growth rates are growth rate differences for these20
firm outcomes compared to the growth rates of control group firms in each case). Our empirical results21
suggest that even exporting firms that have overcome their sunk costs of exporting are sensitive to credit22
constraints. Interestingly, the subsequent reversal of the 1998 policy in 2000 had little impact on bank23
lending and on the export earnings of the firms that were now declassified as priority sector firms and had24
lost their eligibility for subsidized credit. One possible conclusion of our result is that, perhaps, before the25
policy change in 1998, Indian banks were reluctant to lend (or were under lending) to small sized firms26
even if these small sized firms wanted to borrow more at the current market interest rates. The policy27
change forced the banks to change their behavior towards these firms. However, once it was established28
that expanding the credit limit did not lead to increased defaults or risky financial behavior on the part of29
these firms, there was no reason for the banks to alter their relationship with these firms even after the30
policy reversal.31
A paper on banking reforms in India by Bannerjee, Cole, and Duflo [2004] (hereafter referred32
to as BCD) finds evidence of massive under lending by banks, and in particular, by nationalized banks.33
They also find that the official lending policy of banks is very rigid and is characterized by passive lending,34
primarily due to the aggressive vigilance activity that inhibits lending to the private sector and encourages35
lending to the government sector. A key policy implication of our paper is that financial sector reforms in36
emerging economies that improve the access of credit to exporting firms can play a very significant role in37
promoting export oriented growth in the economy. This is specially true for developing countries for which38
a number of studies have shown clear evidence of under lending (see Bannerjee, Cole, and Duflo [2004]).39
Our results for the credit expansion phase of the policy change are similar to those obtained in40
Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] who use the same natural experiment but on a different and a much smaller41
data set and find that Indian firms (their sample is not limited to only exporters, like our sample of firms)42
are credit constrained and that the expansion of credit leads to a higher growth in firm sales.1 However,43
1Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] have a unique dataset comprising of firms which are clients of a large public bank in India. While they are
able to more accurately identify firms that are eligible for priority sector lending from the bank’s survey data, their analysis is limited only to
firms that receive loans from a single bank. This limitation might pose a threat to external validity. In contrast, we consider a panel of firms
which spans the entire industrial composition in Indian manufacturing. Our sample includes both listed as well as unlisted firms and so it
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and in contrast to their results, we find that the credit contraction phase of the policy change had no impact44
on the sales or on the exports of firms that lost their eligibility, whereas they find that the contraction of45
credit leads to a reduction in the sales of firms that lost their eligibility for priority sector lending. Another46
novelty of our paper (as mentioned earlier) is that we focus our attention on firms that are exporters in47
the manufacturing sector. Another paper which is very similar to our paper is the work by Zia [2008]48
who finds that small private non-networked yarn manufacturers in Pakistan suffer a significant decline49
in exports after the removal of subsidized state credit. Another empirical paper of interest is Minetti50
and Zhu [2011].2 Like our paper, these authors use a panel of Italian firms to look at the effect of credit51
rationing specifically on a firm’s exports. In contrast to our paper, they look at the survey response of a52
firm, in their analysis, instead of relying on a firm’s internal financial records. They control for obvious53
confounders (like productivity) and use an instrumental variables approach to account for the endogeneity54
between credit rationing and a firm’s export status (in contrast to a natural experiment as in our case).55
They find results similar to our study - credit rationing lowers the probability of a firm entering export56
markets by as much as 39% and also has an effect on the intensive margin by lowering foreign sales by57
38%. They also find that these credit constraints have a negative effect on domestic sales.58
Our paper adds to the burgeoning literature that uses firm level data to empirically establish59
export-finance linkages. A notable early study in this area is by Beck [2003] and other studies include60
Campa and Shaver [2002] for Spanish exporters, Guariglia and Mateut [2010] for U.K. firms, Paravisini,61
Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon [2011] for Peruvian exporters, Egger and Kesina [2013] for large62
Chinese exporters and Manova [2013]. Similar to our results these studies also find evidence of financial63
constraints affecting export behavior both at the extensive and at the intensive margin. However, a key64
differentiating factor in our paper is that to establish our results we exploit a natural experiment induced65
by a policy change, which leads to an exogeneous variation (increase) in the amount of subsidized credit66
provided to firms and then a subsequent policy reversal which leads to yet another exogenous variation67
(decrease) of this subsidized credit provided to these firms.368
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss the Indian banking sector and the69
policy change; in section 3, we describe our data set; in section 4, we explain our estimation methodology70
and discuss the results and discuss some identification issues with our sample. Section 5 concludes.71
2. THE INDIAN BANKING SECTOR, PRIORITY SECTOR REGULATION AND THE POLICY CHANGE72
2.1. The Indian Banking Sector. In recent years, the Indian banking sector has seen the emergence of73
private banks and many large foreign banks. However, the banking sector is still (by and large) dominated74
by public sector (and nationalized) banks (these are corporatized banks where the government is the75
majority shareholder). For example, 78 percent of total deposits are collected by nationalized banks, 7776
percent of total loans and advances are made by the nationalized banks and about 83 percent of banking77
is not limited only to publicly traded firms. The fact that we use a different database can plausibly explain why we obtain results different
from Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] (for the credit contraction phase). Another reason that could account for the difference in our results could
be lagged treatment effects possibly because of having fewer years in our sample after the second change in policy contracted credit for some
of the firms.
2We would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this paper to our attention.
3A substantive theoretical literature on trade-finance linkages has also developed in parallel to the empirical literature using the frame-
work pioneered by Melitz [2003]. For example, Manova [2013] develops a model of credit constrained firms across countries and shows
that countries at a higher level of financial development export more and also that firms in “financially vulnerable” sectors export more in
countries that are more financially developed compared to countries that suffer from weaker financial markets. Muûls [2008] incorporates
financial constraints both external and internal to a firms in a Melitz type set-up and finds results similar to that of Manova [2013] wherein
both the extensive as well as the intensive margins of trade are affected by credit constraints. Using a Melitz-type setup, Chaney [2013] finds
that both liquidity constraints and firm productivity influence the extensive margin of trade whereas only firm productivity influences the
intensive margin of trade. Feenstra, Li, and Yu [2014] develop a model in which they differentiate between credit constraints facing firms
manufacturing solely for the domestic market versus exporting firms. They show that the time lags involved in shipping exports coupled with
the incomplete knowledge that banks have of firms’ productivity and end use of funds leads to tighter credit constraints on exporters than on
purely domestic firms.
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deposit shares are held by state owned or nationalized banks. In addition to the term loans, nationalized78
banks also issue approximately 37 percent of total loans and advances in the form of cash credits and79
overdraft facilities which are typically used by firms to take care of their short-term working capital80
needs.4 Despite the dominance of these nationalized banks, the Indian banking system is characterized81
by under-lending, that is, firms are willing to absorb more credit at the market interest rates than what82
they are actually given.5 BCD have noted that public sector banks in India were until very recently83
intensely regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). For example, the RBI determined the “maximum84
permissible bank finance” for individual borrowers. For loans over Rs. 20 million, the lending rule was85
based on the working capital gap. This rule was 0.75*[Current Assets - Current Liabilities] (excluding86
bank finance). For loans below Rs. 20 million, the lending rule was based on the projected turnover.87
Here the rule was [0.20*Projected Turnover] where the turnover was determined by the loan officer after88
consultation with the client. After 1997, based on the Nayak committee recommendation, the banks89
were given the flexibility to evolve their own lending policy as long as these policies were made explicit.90
Moreover, the committee’s recommendation favoured the turnover-based approach to calculate the lending91
limits for all loans below Rs. 40 million. However, even after 1997, the RBI played an important role in92
determining the banks lending policy to individual borrowers.93
In a study of the actual lending practices of public sector banks, BCD have also observed that94
despite the change in lending policies, in 78 percent of the cases, the actual limit granted was smaller95
than the maximum amount of loan that was permitted. In 64 percent of the cases, the limit granted did96
not change from the previous year in spite of the fact that according to the bank’s lending rules, the limit97
could have gone up for 64 percent of the cases. The evidence from BCD suggests that nationalized banks in98
India were reluctant to engage in fresh lending decisions. Inertia plays a very important role in explaining99
the behavior of loan officers in public sector banks.100
Another important feature of the Indian banking sector that could explain under-lending is the101
incentive structure faced by the loan officers. Given that nationalized banks are owned by the government,102
the loan officer is treated as a public servant. The general impression among loan officers is that it is very103
easy to be charged with corruption because anti-corruption laws in India state that if any public servant104
takes a decision which results in a financial gain to a third party, then the public servant is guilty of105
corruption till proven innocent. BCD have shown that the fear of being prosecuted reduces lending by106
loan officers in a significant way.107
2.2. Priority Sector Regulation. To promote credit to the priority sector which consists of the agricul-108
tural sector, the small scale industries (SSI hereafter) and “the weaker sections of the society” (for example109
microcredit, self-help groups, self-employed household, etc.), the Government of India mandates that 40110
percent of net bank credit should be reserved for the priority sector.6 This limit is 32 percent for foreign111
banks. In addition, the net bank credit to the agricultural sector cannot be less than 18 percent and the112
net bank credit to the aforementioned “weaker sections” cannot be less than 10 percent. The credit to the113
priority sector can be in the form of either direct finance which is given in the form of short-term, medium114
term or long term loans or in the form of indirect finance, for example, “...term finance/loans in the form of115
4These figures are from Bannerjee, Cole, and Duflo [2004].
5For a detailed discussion on the history of banking reforms in India, see BCD.
6An anonymous referee raised the point that increasing the set of firms that are part of the priority sector should increase the competition
for bank credit within this set of firms. One possible effect of this increased competition for bank funds could be that firms with investment
in plant and machinery of less than Rs. 6.5 million might suddenly become credit constrained having to compete with firms newly admitted
to the priority sector (those with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million to Rs. 30 million). This is an important point
which has implications for the interpretation of our results and our identification strategy. We note that from the policy point of view, simply
allowing more firms to become eligible for priority sector lending doesn’t ease the credit constraint for all firms below the cutoff because the
total amount of credit remains the same. The purpose of our exercise is not to study the effectiveness of the policy in question but to use
the policy change to study if firms are credit constrained and how they would respond to a relaxation of credit constraint. As far as the
identification is concerned, since firms below 6.5 have to now compete with those between 6.5 and 30 for credit, they are at a disadvantage
now, and therefore, it justifies including them in the control group.
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lines of credit made available to State Industrial Development Corporation (SIDBI)/State Financial Cor-116
porations (SFCs) for financing SSIs. Such term finance/loans to the extent granted for/to the Small Scale117
Industrial (SSI) units, will be treated as priority sector lending” (as outlined in the Reserve Bank of India118
Circular [2006] of the RBI on lending to the Priority sector). The interest rates for priority sector lending119
is determined by the RBI and it changes from time to time. For example, during the period of this study,120
the interest rate was fixed at four percent above the prime lending rate.121
2.3. Policy Change. Prior to 1998, firms with a total investment in plant and machinery of less than122
Rs. 6.5 million were classified as SSI and hence were eligible for priority sector lending. In January123
1998, the government broadened the domain of the priority sector by broadening the definition of SSI -124
all firms with investment in plant and machinery of less than Rs. 30 million were now classified as SSI125
and therefore became eligible for priority sector lending. In January 2000, this policy change was partly126
undone by yet another change in the definition of SSI - firms with investment in plant and machinery of127
less than Rs. 10 million were now eligible for priority sector lending while firms with investment in plant128
and machinery greater than Rs. 10 million but less than Rs. 30 million were now declassified as priority129
sector and hence were not eligible for priority sector lending. These two policy changes form the basis of130
our “natural experiment”. For the years 1999, 2000 all new firms that became eligible for priority sector131
lending form the treatment group (these are firms with an investment in plant and machinery between132
Rs. 6.5 million to Rs. 30 million) while from 2001 till 2005 (the final year of our sample) all firms that133
lost their eligibility form the treatment group (these are firms with an investment in plant and machinery134
between Rs. 10 million to Rs. 30 million).135
3. DATA136
The data for our paper comes from the Prowess database from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian137
Economy (CMIE), a private think-tank that provides firm level data on all companies that are traded on138
India’s major stock exchanges and several other PSU’s (Public Sector Undertaking) as well as for unlisted139
companies. The Prowess database comprises of more than 10 years of data and is updated on a daily basis.140
The coverage of Prowess is extensive–all the firms put together account for 75 percent of corporate taxes141
and 95 percent of the excise duty collected by the Indian government. For all these firms, Prowess contains142
detailed data (compiled from firm’s audited annual accounts, stock exchanges, company announcements,143
etc.) on 1500 items which include quantitative information on firm’s production, sales, export earnings,144
expenditure on capital goods, raw materials, power and fuel, labour, etc. It also contains detailed data on145
financial variables like the amount of bank borrowing, other financial institutional borrowing, secured and146
unsecured debt. The database also categorizes firms by industry type according to the 4-digit 1998 NIC147
code (Indian equivalent of the SIC classification scheme). The list of firms spans the industrial composition148
of the Indian economy.7149
In this paper we use firm level data from 1994 to 2005. In table 1, we provide summary statistics150
for the firms in our sample for some of the key variables that we use in our study like sales, exports, total151
bank borrowings etc. Our focus is on the impact of the policy change on exporting firms in particular.152
153
[Insert Table 1]154
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS155
4.1. Credit Constraints and Exports. We use the difference-in-differences estimation strategy to esti-156
mate the causal impact of credit constraints on exporting firms by exploiting a natural experiment pro-157
vided by two policy changes. The first policy change in 1998 made small scale firms eligible for subsidized158
7From the Prowess Database web site at CMIE.
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credit. The second policy change in 2000 was a reversal of the 1998 policy when some firms lost their159
eligibility. We follow a two step procedure to isolate the effects on firm performance of these two policy160
changes. First we study the impact of the expansion of credit on different variables of firm performance161
and then we look at the impact of the subsequent contraction of credit on the same variables.162
In our first step, we look at the impact of the credit expansion in 1998 on the rate of growth of163
several financial and real variables for the firms that became newly eligible for priority sector lending in164
1998. To see this, we run a regression of the following form8:165
ln(y)it− ln(y)it−1 = α0+
∑
t
αtTime t+β1SizeDummy1i(1)
+ β2Y earDummy1t+β3SizeDummy1i×Y earDummy1t
+ Xitγ+εit
where ln(y)it denotes the log of yit and yit in turn represents three different financial variables, viz.,166
(i) total bank borrowing (ii) short term bank borrowing and (iii) interest payments and two real variables,167
viz., (i) sales and (ii) exports.9 10 We note that having the dependent variable in differenced form in the168
above specification helps mitigate autocorrelation (for example, the current amount loaned could be very169
strongly autocorrelated with past loans). Time t is a time dummy for year t that controls for the general170
time trends that affect all firms, SizeDummy1i is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is171
(newly) classified as a priority sector firm in 1998 or in 1999 (that is, if the firm has investment in plant172
and machinery greater than Rs. 6.5 million but less than Rs. 30 million in 1998 or 1999) and is equal173
to zero otherwise.11 Firms that have SizeDummy1i = 1 are therefore firms that comprise the treatment174
group for the initial policy phase of credit expansion. Firms that have SizeDummy1i = 0 are firms that175
comprise the control group.12 This control group comprises of firms that were already in the priority sector176
before 1998 (or older priority sector firms, i.e., those firms with investment in plant and machinery less177
than Rs. 6.5 million) as also firms that were never in the priority sector (all other non-priority sector178
firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million). Y earDummy1t is a dummy179
variable which equals 1 for the year 1999 and 2000 and 0 otherwise. The vector Xit denotes the set180
of all control variables and includes the size of the firm and dummy variables that control for industry181
effects.13The coefficient of interest in the aforementioned regression is the coefficient on the interaction182
term, β3, which measures the differential impact post the policy change of enhanced access to credit for183
the newly defined priority sector firms compared to all firms that are not affected by the policy change184
(see section 4.2 for an interpretation of the interaction term for the case of the specific dependent variable185
that we use in our specification). The time period that we consider in this regression runs from t = 1994186
to 2000.14187
8For notational convenience we suppress the industry indicator j.
9We define a firm as an exporting firm if it has exports of at least Rs. 1 million. At the current exchange rate this is equivalent to
approximately $ 16,000 USD.
10See the appendix for definitions of these variables. Note that sales in our paper refers to the total sales of the firm and not domestic
sales.
11See the appendix for the definition of plant and machinery.
12We are using the standard difference-in-differences specification where the dependent variable is a growth rate itself (and not a level
variable). For the difference-in-differences specification above, the coefficient of SizeDummy1i gives the difference in the growth rate of
the variable of interest between treatment and control group firms in the pre-treatment period (or when Y earDummy1t = 0) whereas the
coefficient on Y earDummy1t gives the difference in the growth rate of the variable of interest over pre and post treatment periods for
the control group of firms (or when SizeDummy1t = 0). The coefficient on the interaction term SizeDummy1i ∗Y earDummy1t is the
difference-in-differences estimator or a measure of the treatment effect. The difference-in-differences estimator gives the differential growth
rate of treated firms compared to firms in the control group in the post-treatment period.
13To control for the fact that the bank might be providing more cash towards bigger firms we use the size of the firm (using log sales) as
control. We also need to account for the fact that lending rules for bank officials specify lending constraints based on the actual (not projected)
firm sales. Industry dummies control for sector specific effects–for example different sectors may have been subjected to different industrial
policies.
14Recall that the reform was reversed in January 2000, so it did not affect credit decisions and availability post 2000.
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In our second step, we run the following difference-in-differences regression:188
ln(y)it− ln(y)it−1 = α0+
∑
t
αtTime t+β1SizeDummy2i(2)
+ β2Y earDummy2t+β3SizeDummy2i×Y earDummy2t
+ Xitγ+εit
where yit represents the same set of variables as before. The time period covered by the above regression is189
now from t = 1999 to 2005. SizeDummy2i is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is declassified190
as a priority sector firm in 2000, that is, if it has investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 10191
million but less than Rs. 30 million in 2000 and is equal to 0 otherwise. Y earDummy2t is a dummy192
variable which is equal 1 for the years 2001 to 2005 and 0 otherwise. The vector Xit once again denotes193
the set of the same control variables as in equation 1, viz., the size of the firm and dummy variables that194
control for industry effects. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term, β3, which195
measures the differential impact of this policy reversal on the declassified priority sector firms compared196
to all the firms that are not affected by this latest policy change (this control group comprises of firms with197
an investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million as well as firms with an investment in198
plant and machinery of less than Rs. 10 million).199
We note here that we also test the robustness of our main results from equations 1 and 2 earlier200
to different control group specifications. For example, for the credit expansion phase, our control group201
comprises of firms that were already in the priority sector before 1998 and also firms that were never in the202
priority sector. These are two different groups of firms. The already priority sector firms have investment203
in plant and machinery less than Rs. 6.5 million while firms that were never in the priority sector have204
investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million. To check the robustness of our results205
we therefore run regression 1 with these two different control groups of firms (for details see section206
4.3.2). Again, recall that the control group for the credit contraction phase of the policy change comprises207
of firms removed from the priority sector. These include both smaller size firms with an investment in208
plant and machinery less than Rs. 10 million and also the larger firms with an investment in plant209
and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million. Again, we check the robustness of our results for the credit210
contraction phase by running regression 2 with these these two different groups of firms (for details see211
section 4.4.1). We also note here that our dependent variable is itself the growth rate of a variable. The212
“standard” difference-in-differences specification allows for levels of the dependent variable to be different213
for treatment and control groups. It requires that the trends in treatment and control groups be the same.214
In our case, since the dependent variable is itself a growth rate we require the trends in the growth rates215
for treatment and control group firms to be the same. This is a much weaker identification requirement216
since a-priori there is no reason to believe that the growth rates for treatment and control group firms217
should be any different. (for details see section 4.2). This is important since our main result involves218
comparing a treatment group with control groups that comprise of very different groups of firms.219
Before we present our results, it is important to discuss the possible behavior of credit constrained220
firms vis-a-vis unconstrained firms in response to these policy changes. As discussed in Bannerjee and Du-221
flo [2014], when new firms are classified as priority sector firms, then both constrained and unconstrained222
firms would be willing to absorb more credit if it is cheaper than other existing sources of credit. However,223
a constrained firm will use this credit primarily to expand output/sales whereas an unconstrained firm224
will use this credit primarily as a substitute for other more expensive sources of credit. An opposite set225
of conclusions holds for the credit contraction phase of the policy change. As a result, for unconstrained226
firms, we should see a much larger effect of the policy change on the profitability of the firm while we227
should see little or no impact on the sales of the firm. In contrast, for constrained firms, we should see a228
substantial impact of the policy change on the sales (either domestic or foreign) of the firm.15229
15The rationale for these results is straightforward. If a firm is credit constrained then by definition, the marginal product of capital is
higher than the rate of interest on the marginal amount borrowed. If such a firm is offered credit that is cheaper than the ongoing market
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4.2. Identification Issues. We now note some issues with the regression specifications 1 and 2 vis-a-vis230
identification. First, note that the policy change was exogenous at least with respect to our main variable231
of interest – exports. The policy was not implemented or targeted at exporting firms specifically. That is232
the thrust of the policy was not to increase export earnings of firms. So the treatment could be considered233
as exogenous at least for our main outcome variable.16 Moreover, as the criterion for priority sector lending234
was based on the plant and machinery in the firm, it was also not possible for firms to sort themselves235
below the threshold and get subsidized credit. Second, the dependent variable in our specification in236
equations 1 and 2 is itself a growth rate (unlike in conventional difference-in-differences specifications237
where the dependent variable is usually in levels). Our formulation is similar to the specification used in238
Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] who posit a simple parametric model where the estimation strategy involves239
estimating the difference in variable growth rates between treatment and control group firms pre and240
post treatment. Therefore in our specification, the coefficients of the interaction terms β3SizeDummy1i×241
Y earDummy1t and β3SizeDummy2i×Y earDummy2t in equations 1 and 2 measure the difference in the242
growth rates of the variable y between treatment and control group firms pre and post treatment (or what243
Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] call a “triple difference”). We note that for the specification given in 1 and 2 the244
identification assumption is that in the absence of treatment or the policy change there are no differential245
changes in the growth rates for treatment and control firms (which can happen if treatment group firms246
would have grown faster anyway, for example). So the assumption underlying our identification strategy247
is that treated firms would have the same trends for the growth rates of the variables under study had248
they not been treated. The counterfactual trend for the treatment group (or the counterfactual growth249
rate in our case) is of course never observed. The best that we can do in this case is to show the trend in250
the growth rates for different variables in the pre-treatment period to strengthen identification.251
So to this end we show plots of the growth rates of treatment and control group firms in the pre-252
treatment period for major variables of interest, viz., sales and exports. These are average growth rates for253
the treatment and control group firms for each year for these two variables. We also show the numerical254
values of the growth rates for these two variables in the plots itself.255
[Insert figure1]256
For our two key variables of interest, sales and exports, we show plots of these variables in figure1.257
Before we discuss figure 1, recall the definition of treatment and control group of firms in each phase of258
the policy change. Recall that for the credit expansion phase of the policy change treated firms are firms259
with an investment between Rs. 6.5 to Rs. 30 million in 1998 which are the newly emergent priority sector260
firms and control group comprises of all other firms. Recall also that for the credit contraction phase of the261
policy change treated firms are firms with an investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 to Rs. 30262
million in 2000 which are the firms that are removed from the priority sector and all other firms are in the263
control group. We note that the treatment group during the credit contraction phase of the policy change264
(which comprises of firms that were removed from the priority sector or firms with an investment in plant265
and machinery between Rs. 10 to Rs. 30 million) comprises a large fraction of the firms that are treated266
rate, the firm will use this credit to invest in capital until the marginal rate of capital is equal to the interest rate. In contrast, a firm that is
not credit constrained will use this cheap credit to payoff its outstanding debts.
16Priority sector lending has a long history going back to the time right after India’s independence with the setup of the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) in 1951. The RBI is the central bank of the country and it also has the remit for priority sector lending. The RBI directs changes
in priority sector lending with a goal to make credit accessible and thereby help in general development. The RBI has made continued efforts
to facilitate availability of credit to specific sectors of the economy deemed to be in need of credit. Since independence the thrust of the RBI
(and of successive governments in India at the center) in facilitating credit access has been evident in the policies pursued by the RBI (and
the government). These policies include nationalization of banks (in two waves – one in 1969 and another in 1980), increasing the breadth
and scope of the banking sector (for example, by requiring branches to be set up in rural parts of the country), etc. The policies that we
are concerned with in our paper are a natural continuation of the efforts of the RBI (and of successive Indian governments) to provide (a
pre-allotted portion of banks’) funds to a few specific sectors (including among other sectors, micro and small scale enterprises). Keeping
these facts in mind we are very skeptical if these policies were designed specifically for export promotion allaying any concerns regarding
endogeneity for our main outcome of interest - exports. We also note that the work by Bannerjee, Cole, and Duflo [2004] is based on the very
same (quasi) natural experiment.
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during the credit expansion part of the policy change (firms that have an investment between Rs. 6.5 to267
Rs. 30 million). Therefore, there is a sizeable overlap in the treatment groups in the two phases of the268
policy change.Only firms with an investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 to Rs. 10 million269
which were treated in the credit expansion phase are excluded from the treatment group in the credit270
contraction phase. In other words the much larger fraction of firms or firms with investment in plant and271
machinery between Rs. 10 to Rs. 30 million are treated firms during both the credit expansion as well as272
the credit contraction phase. These group of firms get an injection of credit during the credit expansion273
phase and a subsequent reduction in cheap credit during the credit contraction phase.274
Keeping in mind the considerable overlap of the treatment groups during both phases of the policy275
change let us now consider figure 1. A cursory look at figure 1, establishes visually that while the growth276
path of major variables is not exactly parallel for all of the variables the general trend for treatment and277
control groups is the same pre-treatment. In figure 1 the graphs show convincing evidence of parallel278
movement in the pre-treatment period for treated and control group firms for the major real variables279
of interest – sales and exports. We also note that figure 1 indicates (given our considerable overlap of280
treatment groups in the two phases of the policy change) that we can rule out the possibility that the281
difference in results that we obtain between the credit expansion and credit contraction phases of the282
policy change does not stem from the fact that the treated group (treated during the initial phase of the283
policy change) was growing at a faster rate than other control groups during any of the periods under284
consideration.285
4.3. Policy Change 1998.286
4.3.1. Effects of Credit Expansion. The result of the impact of the credit expansion phase of the policy287
change is reported in table 2.288
[Insert table 2]289
We focus attention on the interaction term which is the difference-in-differences estimate (recall that in290
our case this is a growth rate difference). We find from table 2 that the coefficient of the interaction term291
is positive and significant for a number of specifications. For the variables representing various types of292
borrowing (the first two columns) the coefficient of the positive interaction term with high point estimates293
indicates that relative to firms in the control group, firms in the treatment group enjoyed a higher growth294
of bank borrowing. On average, the rate of growth of short-term bank borrowing for newly emergent295
priority sector firms increased by approximately 17 percent (relative to control group firms) following the296
policy change in 1998. Total bank borrowing of these firms increased by around 20 percent.17 We also find297
that the policy change in 1998 had no effect on the rate of growth of sales of the firm.18 Our key result is298
the impact of the policy change on the rate of growth of exports. We find that the growth rate of exports299
for treated firms increased by approximately 24 percent compared to the growth rate for control group300
firms. So, the major impact of the enhanced access to credit for exporting firms was on the exports of these301
firms. This is an important result. Exporting firms have to incur large sunk costs to break into export302
markets which have to be paid up front.19 We observe that the growth in credit is matched by a growth303
17As Bannerjee and Duflo [2014] point out, lending to smaller clients is more costly and so ex-ante one should expect that banks would
be saving on the cost of the cost of lending if they shifted their lending to the larger firms that newly became part of the priority sector. Of
course, post reform the banks could be more selective in their choice of clients to fill in their priority sector quota. For both of these reasons
the new members in the priority sector (or our treatment of firms) should by receiving more credit relative to firm already in the priority
sector.
18We note that the coefficient on sales has the correct sign but is not statistically significant. We note that sales in our paper refers to
total sales and not domestic sales. It might be interesting (and we thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out) to look only at domestic
sales instead of total sales since domestic sales are arguably not dependent on the supply of credit while foreign (and by extension total sales)
are. Unfortunately, CMIE does not provide data on (exclusively) domestic sales.
19See the empirical literature, for example, Roberts and Tybout [1995] for an example of hysteresis effects in export markets. Note that
we are looking at the intensive margin where working capital is more important. The firms that are exporters have already managed to
break into export markets (they changed the extensive margin when they entered the export market) and to do that they would likely have
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in exports – a clear indication of credit constrained behaviour. So our results would suggest that even304
for firms that have successfully broken into export markets, credit is still constrained. The (arguably)305
exogenous variation in credit to exporting firms results in higher sales growth of these firms in foreign306
markets. We also note that the coefficient on the interest payment (column 3) is not significant, which is307
expected since subsidized credit is not offered to firms at lower interest rates, so interest payments from308
firms should not change.20309
4.3.2. Alternative Control Groups : Credit Expansion. We check the robustness of our results for the310
credit expansion phase of the policy change. These robustness exercises are described below. As our first311
exercise, we check the robustness of our results to alternative control groups during the credit expansion312
phase of the policy change. As mentioned earlier in section 4, the control group for the specification313
in regression 1 reported in table 2 comprises of firms that that were already in the priority sector (the314
older priority sector firms, i.e., those firms with investment in plant and machinery less than Rs. 6.5315
million) and also firms that were never in the priority sector (all other non-priority sector firms with316
investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million). These two groups of firms have different317
firm characteristics which might lead the policy changes to have different impact on firms outcomes.318
So we repeat our difference-in-differences exercise with different control groups of firms (with the same319
treatment group of firms).320
We now consider regression 1 but now only with the sample of firms that were always in the priority321
sector as our control group. These firms are small sized firms with investment in plant and machinery less322
than Rs. 6.5 million. The result of this regression with this new control group is reported table 2 under323
the header “Only small firms as control”. The results in table 2 with only small firms as control shows324
once again a positive differential growth rate for most of the financial variables for the newly emergent325
priority sector firms (although not all of these coefficients are significant at the conventional levels of326
significance). These results seem to suggest that compared to the small firms that were already in the327
priority sector newly emergent priority sector firms were also growing faster post-reform than pre-reform328
which reinforces the claim of credit constrained behaviour. Our most important result is the effect that329
the credit expansion has on the exports of the new priority sector firms. Once again we obtain a positive330
difference in the growth rates of exports between the treatment group of new priority sector firms and the331
(new) control group of firms that were always in the priority sector. So, newly emergent priority sector332
firms were having faster growth in real variables compared to the firms that were fortunate enough to be333
always in the priority sector.334
Next, we once again restrict the sample size and now consider as a control group only those firms335
that were never in the priority sector. These are firms that had an investment in plant and machinery of336
more than Rs. 30 million. The result of this regression is reported in table 2 under the header “Only large337
firms as control”. These results show a similar positive growth differential for newly emergent priority338
sector firms which suggests that during the credit expansion phase of the policy change newly emergent339
priority sector firms were growing faster than larger firms never in the priority sector. The signs of340
the coefficients on the interaction term for all variables is positive. We note in particular the positive341
coefficient on exports. Overall from the results table 2, we can conclude that our result of a positive effect342
on real firm outcomes for treatment group firms during the credit expansion part of the policy change is343
quite robust to alternative specifications involving different control groups of firms.21344
to be financially sound (the extant literature has clearly linked breaking into export markets and financial strength) – and yet these same
firms behave like they were credit constrained when they are offered priority credit. So it is surprising result that even firms that manage to
break into export markets incurring considerable sunk costs still face such working capital constraints later.
20It may be argued here that if credit has expanded then interest payments must also expand. However, the likely reason for not finding
this result is because the firms have partly substituted the more expensive credit with now the relatively cheaper credit from the banks (even
though the banks offered the same interest rate) and also expanded their credit from banks. As a result the overall interest payments might
not change even though the firms are borrowing lot more, because interest payments include all the interest payments.
21It is surprising that the growth rate of sales is insignificant in table 2 when all firms are used as control. But we note that the coefficient
on sales growth is significant once only large firms are included as the control group.
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4.4. Policy Change 2000. In 2000, some of the firms that were previously classified as priority sector in345
1998 were removed from the priority sector. Now the banks were no longer required to provide directed346
lending under the priority sector regulation to these declassified firms (firms with an investment in plant347
and machinery between Rs. 10 and Rs. 30 million). However, the bank was free to renegotiate the terms348
of contract (credit limit and the interest rates) with these firms. The key implication of this policy change349
was that banks could now either reduce the credit limit to these firms or maintain the same credit limit350
depending on the firm’s performance.351
The results of the regression for the credit contraction phase are reported in table 3 under the352
header “All firms as control”.22353
[Insert table 3 ]354
The results in table 3 suggest that (surprisingly) compared to the credit expansion phase in 1998, the355
policy reversal in 2000 had a far lesser impact on the growth of (total or short term) bank borrowings of356
the affected firms when compared with firms that remained in the priority sector. Most of the coefficients357
in table 3 are insignificant (at the conventional 1 percent and 5 percent level) other than the coefficients358
on total and short term borrowing which is expected. However, the policy change had little impact on the359
rate of growth of sales or on exports of the firm compared to the growth rate of control group firms. In fact,360
the coefficient on sales in table 3 shows a growth differential of only 3 percent (and it is not statistically361
significant) while exports are reduced by 6 percent (once again not significant). Unlike the results in362
the credit expansion phase of the policy change (reported in table 2) none of the coefficients on the real363
variables are statistically significant. So there is no clear effect of the credit contraction either on domestic364
firm sales or on the exports of firms that were removed from the priority sector. We note again that this365
result is different from those obtained in Bannerjee and Duflo [2014].366
These results show that the effects of the credit contraction phase of the policy change are quite367
different from what we would expect a-priori – removal of firms from the priority sector does not seem to368
affect either the credit given to these firms or firm outcomes like sales or exports. Our explanation for this369
result is the following. As discussed earlier, the Indian banking system is characterized by under-lending370
primarily due to the rigid lending policies, inertia and the fear of prosecution by public loan officers.371
In 1998, after the change in the definition of SSI, the banks were compelled under the priority sector372
regulation to increase their limits to the newly classified priority sector firms. As a result of this enhanced373
access to credit, firms were able to grow rapidly and increase their turnover (as measured by the growth374
in the turnover of these firms). However, in 2000, when these firms were declassified as priority sector375
firms, the banks still followed their stringent lending policy but given the performance of the firms, there376
was no reason for the loan officers to reduce the growth of credit to such firms and hence no slowing down377
of real growth rates. Thus the subsequent policy change in 2000 had little or no impact on the firms that378
were declassified as priority sector.379
4.4.1. Alternative Control Groups : Credit Contraction. We repeat our robustness exercise for the credit380
expansion phase of the policy change also for the credit contraction phase of the policy change. We recall381
that the control group in the regression given by specification 2 earlier comprises of smaller size firms382
with an investment in plant and machinery less than Rs. 10 million as also the larger firms with an383
investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million that were never in the priority sector.384
Following our earlier exercise in which we limited the samples for the credit expansion phase of the policy385
change to allow for different control groups, we now follow a similar exercise for the credit contraction386
phase of the policy change. We now consider as robustness check regression 2 with different control387
groups. First, we consider as a control group firms with an investment in plant and machinery less than388
Rs. 10 million (note that this control group does not comprise of only firms that were always part of the389
22When considering the size dummy for the credit contraction phase, we always consider firm size in the year of the policy change which
is 2000. This ensures that we have a consistent group of firms for treatment and control.
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priority sector). These results are reported in table 3 under the header “Small firms as control”. These390
results show a negative (but insignificant) growth differential for firms that are removed from the priority391
sector compared with the new control group of firms (which are firms with an investment in plant and392
machinery below Rs. 10 million). These results are broadly in agreement with the results in table 3 with393
all firms as control, but the magnitude of the differentials between treatment and control growth rates are394
larger. Next, we restrict the sample size again and consider only large sized firms that were never in the395
priority sector as the control group. These are firms that had investment in plant and machinery of more396
than Rs.30 million. The result of this regression is reported under the header “Large firms as control” in397
table 3. These results also show negative differentials for firms that are removed from the priority sector398
(compared with firms with an investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million as control)399
but the magnitudes of these differentials are lower than the case when all firms are used as control but400
are comparable with the magnitudes of the differential obtained with only small firms as control. Overall401
our results during the credit contraction phase of the policy change have a consistent sign over alternative402
specifications involving different control groups of firms.403
4.5. Additional Robustness Tests : Regressions involving unlisted firms. We check the robustness404
of our results by limiting our sample to unlisted firms only. We note that the Prowess data base includes405
information on unlisted companies also (and is not limited to only firms listed in the stock exchange).406
Unlisted companies include public limited companies and private limited companies. We note that in-407
formation on these unlisted companies, particularly private limited companies, is not easily available.408
However, CMIE makes its best efforts to include as many public and private limited companies as pos-409
sible. This makes our sample representative since listed firms typically tend to be the bigger and more410
well-established firms.23 So our sample of firms is a representative sample of Indian manufacturing firms411
in general. However, as a robustness check we re-run all our regression specifications using a sub-sample412
of only unlisted firms.24 We consider three different control groups of firms as we did for our full sample413
(where we had both listed and unlisted firms as given in table 2) and the same treatment group. These414
results are reported in table 4 for the credit expansion phase of the policy change. Our results from the415
restricted sub-sample of unlisted firms are in general agreement with the results that we present in this416
paper with the full sample of firms. Importantly, the coefficient on exports is positive and significant for417
the case when all firms are used as control and also for the case when only large firms are used as control.418
[Insert table 4 ]419
Next we repeat our regressions for unlisted firms with different control groups for the credit contraction420
phase of the policy change and these results are reported table 5.421
[Insert table 5 ]422
Once again the results for the credit contraction phase of the policy change for unlisted firms are in423
agreement with the results in table 3. We find little evidence to indicate that the reduction in credit424
affected the unlisted firms adversely.425
5. CONCLUSION426
In this paper, we contribute to the empirical literature on export-finance linkage. In particular, we427
study the causal impact of credit constraints on exporting firms by exploiting two policy changes in India428
that affected the availability of subsidized credit to some firms. The first policy change which took place in429
1998 classified some firms as priority sector and made them eligible for subsidized credit lending from the430
23In our correspondence with CMIE it has been communicated to us that “...The Prowess database covers all Indian companies for which
relevant data became available to CMIE without any restrictions of use. Companies included in Prowess are not selected or filtered by any
process.” So the Prowess Prowess aims to cover all business entities for which reasonably reliable structured information is available.
24Once again we consider only exporting firms in these regressions.
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banks. We find evidence to indicate that the affected firms were credit constrained and the policy change431
which relaxed the credit constraints had a positive impact on the rate of growth of exports of the affected432
firms compared to growth rate of control group firms. However in 2000, when this policy was reversed and433
some of the firms were declassified as priority sector firms, there was little effect on the rate of growth434
of bank borrowing and almost no change in the rate of growth of exports for these firms. This finding435
suggests that once the bank-firm relationship was developed in terms of credit limit, there was no reason436
for the bank to renegotiate the terms of the credit as long as the firm had not defaulted. Our results also437
highlight the nature of lending by the Indian banking sector that is dominated by the public sector banks.438
Indian banks are characterized by under-lending primarily because the loan officers are not incentivized439
for good lending but they are penalized very heavily if the loans go bad. Perhaps the policy change in 1998440
“nudged” the Indian banks to increase their exposure to the smaller firms which allowed the firms to grow441
rapidly and as long as the firms did not default, there was no reason for the banks to reduce the credit442
even when the policy was reversed and the firms were declassified as priority sector firms. This is an issue443
which needs further investigation.444
Page 12
TABLE 1. Summary Statistics : Variables in Levels (1994-2005) † ‡
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Short term Bank Borrowings 10.466 69.541 30808
Total Bank Borrowings 12.906 83.334 40896
Plant and Machinery 45.279 342.956 40896
Sales 93.597 926.027 40896
Exports 8.231 72.699 40896
Interest Expenses 4.241 22.246 33065
† All figures in the above table are in Indian Rupees (INR).
‡ See the Appendix for definitions of the variables.
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FIGURE 1. Yearly plot of real variable growth rates. Evidence of parallel trends. The figure
shows the average yearly growth rates in the pre-treatment period (treatment takes place in 1998) for real
outcome variables - sales and exports. Treated firms are firms with investment in plant and machinery
between Rs.10 to Rs. 30 million. These firms are treated during the credit expansion phase of the policy
change in 1998 when they receive subsidized credit and again in 2000 when they are removed from the
priority sector. All other firms are in the control group. Note that firms with investment in plant and
machinery between Rs.6.5 to Rs. 10 million which were treated during the credit expansion phase as not
all these firms are removed from the priority sector during the credit contraction phase.
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TABLE 2. Credit Expansion † §
Financial Real
Bank Short-term Interest Sales Exports
Borrowing Bank Borrowing Payments
All firms as control
‡ SizeDummy1*YearDummy1 0.203** 0.169* 0.022 0.056 0.238***
(0.068) (0.074) (0.042) (0.041) (0.067)
SizeDummy1 -0.014 -0.023 -0.016 -0.046+ -0.133**
(0.028) (0.038) (0.034) (0.026) (0.044)
YearDummy1 -0.124*** -0.103** -0.168*** -0.065** -0.156***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) (0.031)
Log Sales -0.001 -0.011+ 0.000 -0.004 -0.034***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
No. of Obvs. 9083 7909 8371 9546 8799
Only small firms as control
‡ ‡ SizeDummy1*YearDummy1 0.373* 0.233 -0.042 0.048 0.231*
(0.175) (0.189) (0.157) (0.147) (0.108)
SizeDummy1 -0.038 -0.026 -0.008 -0.136*** -0.165*
(0.068) (0.065) (0.044) (0.036) (0.081)
YearDummy1 -0.314 -0.204 -0.048 -0.025 -0.271*
(0.213) (0.195) (0.170) (0.170) (0.105)
Log Sales 0.006 -0.012 0.021 0.020 0.016
(0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.020)
No. of Obvs. 920 786 864 1072 943
Only large firms as control
‡ ‡ ‡ SizeDummy1*YearDummy1 0.211** 0.187* 0.046 0.075+ 0.277***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.041) (0.043) (0.065)
SizeDummy1 -0.036 -0.055 -0.045 -0.062* -0.185***
(0.039) (0.044) (0.034) (0.026) (0.041)
YearDummy1 -0.123*** -0.103** -0.169*** -0.069** -0.155***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) (0.031)
Log Sales -0.003 -0.013* -0.003 -0.005 -0.038***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
No. of Obvs. 8911 7764 8206 9318 8596
† Each column represents the dependent variable in a regression on SizeDummy1, YearDummy1 and SizeDummy1*YearDummy1(the
difference-in-differences estimator). All regressions include time dummies and control for firm size using log sales as control. The time
period covered by this regression is from 1994 to 2000.
‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998 or in
1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below
Rs. 6.5 million which were always part of priority sector and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million
which were never part of priority sector.
‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998
or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery
below Rs. 6.5 million which were always part of priority sector.
‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998
or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery
above Rs. 30 million which were never part of the priority sector.
§ Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at :+ p< 0.10 ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001.Standard
errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level.
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TABLE 3. Credit Contraction † §
Financial Real
Bank Short-term Interest Sales Exports
Borrowing Bank Borrowing Payments
All firms as control
‡ SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 -0.144* -0.141+ 0.053 -0.033 -0.066
(0.065) (0.070) (0.053) (0.037) (0.070)
SizeDummy2 0.197*** 0.186** 0.044 0.089* 0.174**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.049) (0.035) (0.055)
YearDummy2 0.018 -0.038 -0.082*** -0.034* 0.052*
(0.033) (0.031) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023)
Log Sales 0.005 0.002 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.019*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
No. of Obvs. 9352 8097 8834 10289 9616
Only small firms as control
‡ ‡ SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 -0.265+ -0.235 -0.121 -0.030 -0.272*
(0.152) (0.181) (0.094) (0.123) (0.111)
SizeDummy2 0.169 0.148 0.041 -0.077 0.246*
(0.160) (0.167) (0.077) (0.102) (0.118)
YearDummy2 0.113 0.145 -0.001 -0.127 0.202*
(0.175) (0.197) (0.096) (0.145) (0.094)
Log Sales 0.048+ 0.057* 0.057* 0.055*** 0.032
(0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.012) (0.023)
No. of Obvs. 643 557 627 838 738
Only large firms as control
‡ ‡ ‡ SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 -0.127+ -0.129+ 0.060 -0.027 -0.054
(0.067) (0.071) (0.054) (0.037) (0.077)
SizeDummy2 0.182** 0.179** 0.044 0.096** 0.170*
(0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.036) (0.066)
YearDummy2 0.016 -0.042 -0.084*** -0.027+ 0.050*
(0.033) (0.032) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024)
Log Sales 0.004 0.002 0.019*** 0.039*** 0.018+
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
No. of Obvs. 9191 7964 8679 10035 9392
† Each column represents the dependent variable in a regression on SizeDummy2, YearDummy2 and SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 (the
difference-in-differences estimator). All regressions include time dummies and control for firm size using log sales as control. The time
period covered by this regression is from 1999 to 2005.
‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs.10 million and Rs.30 million in 2000 which
were removed from the priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs.10
million and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs.30 million.
‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs.10 million and Rs.30 million in 2000 which
were removed from the priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs.10
million.
‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30 million in 2000
which were removed from priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery above Rs. 30
million.
§ Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at :+ p< 0.10 ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001.Standard
errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level.
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TABLE 4. Credit Expansion : Unlisted Firms Only † §
Financial Real
Bank Short-term Interest Sales Exports
Borrowing Bank Borrowing Payments
All firms as control
‡ SizeDummy1*YearDummy1 0.177 0.073 -0.016 -0.005 0.255**
(0.122) (0.134) (0.081) (0.046) (0.083)
SizeDummy1 0.041 0.038 0.043 0.014 -0.072
(0.035) (0.058) (0.047) (0.038) (0.069)
YearDummy1 -0.133** -0.018 -0.093** -0.033 -0.164**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.030) (0.032) (0.049)
Log Sales 0.004 -0.024+ 0.008 0.009 -0.014
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
No. of Obvs. 2956 1937 2130 3166 2892
Only small firms as control
‡ ‡ SizeDummy1*YearDummy1 0.362 0.188 -0.158 -0.118 0.217
(0.274) (0.263) (0.251) (0.171) (0.137)
SizeDummy1 0.093 0.053 0.066 -0.059 -0.091
(0.114) (0.103) (0.093) (0.063) (0.111)
YearDummy1 -0.334 -0.267 0.192 0.111 -0.152
(0.244) (0.208) (0.241) (0.190) (0.128)
Log Sales -0.020 -0.129*** -0.047 0.030 0.026
(0.045) (0.030) (0.063) (0.049) (0.050)
No. of Obvs. 336 223 261 400 351
Only large firms as control
‡ ‡ ‡ SizeDummy1*YearDummy1 0.175 0.100 0.046 0.019 0.248**
(0.144) (0.141) (0.090) (0.043) (0.084)
SizeDummy1 0.031 0.002 -0.020 0.007 -0.084
(0.056) (0.064) (0.054) (0.039) (0.070)
YearDummy1 -0.132* -0.018 -0.100** -0.045 -0.169***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.030) (0.032) (0.048)
Log Sales 0.001 -0.023+ 0.002 0.006 -0.021+
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
No. of Obvs. 2889 1895 2077 3082 2818
† Each column represents the dependent variable in a regression on SizeDummy1, YearDummy1 and SizeDummy1*YearDummy1(the
difference-in-differences estimator). All regressions include time dummies and control for firm size using log sales as control. The time
period covered by this regression is from 1994 to 2000. The estimation sample for results reported in this table comprises of firms that are
not listed in the stock exchange or unlisted firms.
‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998 or in
1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below
Rs. 6.5 million which were always part of priority sector and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs. 30 million
which were never part of priority sector.
‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million which newly
became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 6.5 million
which were always part of priority sector.
‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 6.5 million and Rs. 30 million in 1998
or in 1999 which newly became part of priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery
above Rs. 30 million which were never part of the priority sector.
§ Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at :+ p< 0.10 ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001.Standard
errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level.
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TABLE 5. Credit Contraction : Unlisted Firms Only † §
Financial Real
Bank Short-term Interest Sales Exports
Borrowing Bank Borrowing Payments
All firms as control
‡ SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 -0.133 -0.156 0.020 0.033 -0.066
(0.139) (0.165) (0.105) (0.054) (0.085)
SizeDummy2 0.243+ 0.247 0.105 0.044 0.125
(0.125) (0.159) (0.103) (0.053) (0.078)
YearDummy2 0.043 -0.081+ -0.074* -0.047+ 0.071
(0.059) (0.047) (0.032) (0.027) (0.051)
Log Sales -0.011 -0.004 0.024** 0.042*** 0.022
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.017)
No. of Obvs. 3337 2235 2550 3791 3484
Only small firms as control
‡ ‡ SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 -0.308 -0.142 -0.256 0.043 -0.220
(0.272) (0.295) (0.214) (0.153) (0.175)
SizeDummy2 0.458 0.319 0.132 -0.071 0.118
(0.326) (0.297) (0.177) (0.159) (0.117)
YearDummy2 0.200 0.121 -0.014 -0.173 0.116
(0.204) (0.207) (0.160) (0.158) (0.112)
Log Sales -0.069 -0.074 0.038 0.043+ 0.029
(0.053) (0.050) (0.054) (0.024) (0.032)
No. of Obvs. 279 199 257 386 331
Only large firms as control
‡ ‡ ‡ SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 -0.113 -0.146 -0.007 0.032 -0.066
(0.142) (0.166) (0.112) (0.054) (0.081)
SizeDummy2 0.221+ 0.236 0.145 0.052 0.137
(0.125) (0.158) (0.097) (0.054) (0.086)
YearDummy2 0.037 -0.088+ -0.072* -0.032 0.078
(0.057) (0.049) (0.032) (0.025) (0.051)
Log Sales -0.012 -0.004 0.024** 0.041*** 0.022
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.018)
No. of Obvs. 3252 2174 2470 3662 3371
† Each column represents the dependent variable in a regression on SizeDummy2, YearDummy2 and SizeDummy2*YearDummy2 (the
difference-in-differences estimator). All regressions include time dummies and control for firm size using log sales as control. The time
period covered by this regression is from 1999 to 2005. The estimation sample for results reported in this table comprises of firms that are
not listed in the stock exchange or unlisted firms.
‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs.10 million and Rs.30 million in 2000 which
were removed from the priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs.10
million and firms with investment in plant and machinery greater than Rs.30 million.
‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30 million in 2000
which were removed from priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery below Rs. 10
million.
‡ ‡ ‡ The treatment group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery between Rs. 10 million and Rs. 30 million in 2000
which were removed from priority sector and the control group comprises of firms with investment in plant and machinery above Rs. 30
million.
§ Note : t-statistics reported under each coefficient in parenthesis. Significance at :+ p< 0.10 ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001.Standard
errors are clustered at the (3-digit) industry level.
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APPENDIX445
Definitions. The following are definitions of variables used in the paper and are taken verbatim from446
the “Data Dictionary” accompanying the Prowess Database.447
(1) Total Bank borrowing This is the total of loans sourced from banks. It includes loans from banks448
in the form of cash credit, bank overdraft facilities, term loans, etc.449
(2) Sales is the sum of industrial sales and income from non-financial services.450
(3) Short-term bank borrowings are bank loans having a maturity of less than a year. Usually,451
short-term bank borrowing accounts for 75-80 per cent of bank borrowings. All types of loans in452
the form of short-term loans, cash credits, bank overdrafts, etc. are treated at par and all are453
clubbed to show short-term bank borrowing.454
(4) Export (earnings) is the total revenue/income earned from exports of goods.455
(5) Plant and machinery refer to the plant and machinery used in producing goods and services or456
for rental to others. The identification of plant and machinery is a function of the nature of activity457
of the company.458
(6) Variables in the paper459
(a) SizeDummy1: The dummy SizeDummy1 is equal to 1 for firms with investment in plant and460
machinery between Rs 6.5 million and Rs 30 million in 1998 or in 1999 and 0 otherwise.461
(b) YearDummy1: The dummy YearDummy1 is equal to 1 for the years 1999 and 2000 and 0462
otherwise.463
(c) SizeDummy2: The dummy SizeDummy2 is equal to 1 for firms with investment in plant and464
machinery between Rs.10 million – Rs.30 million in 2000 and 0 otherwise.465
(d) YearDummy2: The dummy YearDummy2 is equal to 1 for the years 2001-2005 and 0 otherwise.466
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